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Peacekeeping,l965: 
The Canadian Military's Viewpoint 
David A. Lenarcic 
Peacekeeping has become a growth industry over the last few years, both in terms of the 
proliferation of missions and the numerous 
academic analyses of them. However, the 
historical context in which contemporary 
developments are unfolding is often lost in the 
shuffle. This certainly seems to be true in Canada, 
where the past apparently holds little relevance 
for the present when it comes to peacekeeping. 
The seminal changes that have accompanied 
the emergence of the "post-Cold War" era have 
led Canada to seriously re-evaluate the 
peacekeeping role of the armed forces. Since 
1993, two Parliamentary committee studies on 
new-age peacekeeping. a defence policy White 
Paper, and a government report on a United 
Nations rapid reaction force have appeared. 
Yet, one would be hard-pressed to find in 
media and even scholarly accounts of these events 
any reference to the fact that thirty years ago the 
Canadian government was engaged in a very 
similar process of re-examination. An explosive 
expansion of peacekeeping activities, coupled with 
dissatisfaction with the UN's ad-hoc approach and 
the inability of peacekeeping to lead to 
peacemaking, acted as a catalyst for the launching 
of reappraisals within the Departments of 
National Defence and External Affairs. 
In particular. in 1964 the Canadian 
government used the occasion of hosting an 
international conference in Ottawa of military 
experts on the technical aspects of peacekeeping 
to produce a bevy of studies on the Canadian 
experience. However, these were intended for 
circulation to delegates from other countries and 
were thus somewhat sanitized. Papers designed 
for Canadian eyes only are consequently much 
more revealing. The one re-printed here falls into 
that category. It provides a frank assessment 
based on first-hand experience and therefore 
presents a fascinating snapshot of the Canadian 
military's outlook on peacekeeping during its 
1960s hey-day. 
The author of the report, Brigadier N.G. 
Wilson-Smith, had recently commanded the 
Canadian contingent in Cyprus. He had just 
drafted an appraisal of UNFICYP in which he had 
recommended that an extensive study of 
peacekeeping and its military implications be 
conducted. Some of his own views on this score 
are evident in the report published here. 
Canadians today - well acquainted with the 
dangers of peacekeeping by half-measures in the 
former Yugoslavia - will for instance have no 
trouble relating to the discussion of"Arbitration" 
in paragraph 9. 
The Brigadier's earlier report on Cyprus also 
contained one of the earliest expressions of what 
has become an oft-quoted statement and in some 
circles conventional wisdom. "In a situation where 
men must stand between highly armed, trigger-
happy fighters, a soldier's training and a strict 
military discipline is needed", Wilson-Smith 
wrote. "In short- this is not [a] job for a soldier 
but only a soldier can do this job." 
Much of the report reproduced below revolves 
around this notion and the related question of 
peacekeeping training. 1 This issue remains a 
source of debate today and so its long historical 
roots seem worth re-visiting. For example, the 
February 1993 report of the Standing Senate 
Committee on Foreign Affairs looking into 
peacekeeping noted that "The Canadian Forces 
has [sic] been adamant that training as a soldier 
to use force is precisely the training needed to be 
a good peacekeeper. But mediation is not a 
soldierly skill; it is not warlike or militaristic. It 
is the opposite of those attributes. Especially with 
soldiers trained for war, it needs to be encouraged 
and stimulated: they need training in it." In its 
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June 1993 examination of peacekeeping, the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on 
National Defence and Veterans Affairs likewise 
emphasized that "basic military training should 
be supplemented by special peacekeeping training 
which would enhance not only the knowledge 
soldiers have of the particular characteristics of 
the theatre of operations, but also the skills they 
will need to carry the mission through [such as] 
training in conflict resolution, mediation and 
negotiation." This sounds very much like the 
argument which one Department of External 
Affairs official made 30 years earlier on the 
question of military indoctrination for 
peacekeeping when he asserted that, "it may be 
just as important and perhaps even more 
important to give political and diplomatic training 
to personnel who may be engaged in United 
Nations field operations." 
Reading Brigadier Wilson-Smith's report, one 
wonders what he would think of such 
recommendations or, indeed, of the recent 
establishment of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian 
International Peacekeeping Training Centre. Might 
he judge them superfluous? Or would he 
acknowledge that the radically changing face of 
peacekeeping today requires new approaches? 
Conversely, might those currently serving in 
Canada's military nod in agreement at the 
Brigadier's observations? Or would they perceive 
them as outdated? 
Similar questions could be asked of Wilson-
Smith's provocative comments in paragraph 12 
regarding the connection between peacekeeping 
and morale. Major-General Clive Milner of 
Canada, who, ironically enough, served as UN 
commander in Cyprus, offered a different opinion 
to the 1993 Senate Committee: 
There is nothing like the completion of a six-
month or one-year assignment to a United 
Nations mission by a Canadian officer or soldier 
to raise his morale. because he feels that he has 
done something for himself. for his unit, for his 
uniform, for his country and for the world at 
large. There is a tremendous feeling of 
satisfaction when that young man or young 
woman comes home and is able to say. "I helped 
keep the peace. I may have helped save lives. I 
helped people in distress. people who were much 
worse off than I am ... "As an individual it raises 
morale. Collectively as a unit it certainly does. 
and therefore it contributes to the well-being of 
the Canadian Forces at large. 
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Excerpts from a Department of National 
Defence document which summarized responses 
to Brigadier Wilson-Smith's report are also 
included here. "In our opinion," the Assistant 
Chief of the Defence Staff had indicated in a 
memorandum requesting comments on it, "this 
paper has been well-developed and can be quite 
useful as a guide for the type of forces that could 
be used in future peacekeeping operations in 
which Canada may become involved." The second 
document suggests a broad consensus within the 
higher levels of the Canadian military that Wilson-
Smith's observations were generally accurate. 
Paragraph 10 is particularly intriguing. What is 
the motivation behind the desire of the Brigadier's 
colleagues to keep his attitude toward the training 
and morale aspects of peacekeeping from 
becoming public knowledge? Do they wish to 
disguise a certain lack of enthusiasm for the role 
on the part of the armed forces? 
At a time when severe funding cut-backs have 
some advocating - as others did in the 1960s 
when the three services were unified - that the 
Canadian Armed Forces should specialize in 
peacekeeping, these historical documents provide 
much food for thought. At the very least, they 
suggest that old peacekeeping debates neither die 
nor fade away. 
Notes 
l. The Canadian Army Annual Training Directive for 1964 I 
65 listed "to train designated individuals and units to 
carry out...limited warfare including peacekeeping 
operations and security-type operations" as one of the 
aims of training in Canada. Such units received two to 
six months of specialist training prior to deployment. 
One major peacekeeping exercise was conducted 
annually. In addition. a week long orientation course 
was held each year for officers selected for UN service. 
Briefing and debriefing of personnel on UN duty was 
also regularly carried out. Although the subject of 
peacekeeping was included to some extent in courses at 
Canadian military schools. there were no special training 
schools in Canada for peacekeeping. ("Peacel<:eeping 
Operations Questionnaire: Visit of USN Officer- Capt. 
C.B. Landes, USN.·· 15 Aprill965. NAC RG 24 Accession 
83-84/167 Box 7162. File 2.5080.3 Part 3.) 
Dr. David Lenarcic is a Faculty Associate with 
the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and 
Disarmament Studies. He is currently 
working on a manuscript dealing with 
peacekeeping in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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CONFIDENTIAL 
Headquarters 
3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group 
Carleton Barracks 
Camp Gagetown 
OROMOCTO, N.B. 
June 1965 
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
AIM 
1. To outline the strength levels and types of troops required for peacekeeping operations. 
GENERAL 
2. There are three levels of peacekeeping operations: 
a. Observation, which is examination without participation. 
b. Mediation. which involves intervening with the purpose of reconciliation. 
c. Arbitration, which requires the application of judgement to settle a dispute, with the 
judge in full control. 
OBSERVATION 
3. Observation requires officers with sufficient military experience to recognize what is a significant 
tactical event. and to identify clearly military weapons and effects. They must be of sufficient rank 
to provide this experience, and also to ensure themselves freedom of movement and access to the 
senior officers of both sides of the dispute. This normally requires that these officers be of the rank 
of major. though in some cases captains could be employed. 
4. The numbers required are dependent on the scale of the conflict and the distances involved. Normally 
however, given good communications and good mobility, it is possible for a relatively small number 
of officers to cover a wide area of operations. 
MEDIATION 
5. Unlike observation. mediation requires active participation with both sides in the dispute. Mediators 
must listen to the claims of both sides and present them to the opposing sides, and then attempt 
to arrange agreement by negotiation. Before mediation can commence there must be an agreed 
cease-fire. Troops must be interposed to supervise the cease-fire and observe and assess 
responsibility if it is broken. 
6. In an active controversy neither side can be expected to present the truth when making their 
claims. Mediation. therefore, requires independent information. This requires the interposed forces 
in the area of engagement, and further forces in depth, all with sufficient training and equipment 
that they can exercise close observation over both sides. 
7. The task of interposing and observation can be done by well trained soldiers, with the mediation 
being done by officers. A mediation force therefore requires trained and disciplined soldiers, a 
command structure and an attendant staff and liaison, communications, and logistic support. 
Reconnaissance elements with suitable equipment are required for surveillance in depth. Weapon 
establishment can be restricted to those weapons necessary for self-defence and the defence of the 
unit should one or other, or both, of the warring parties turn on the peacekeeping force. Reserves 
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are not required for the operation, though some reserves would be required to rotate troops for rest 
and recreation. 
8. It is difficult to arrive at a scale of strength required for mediation. as needs are dependent on 
topography, distances and strength of the opposing parties. For example, more men are required 
in built-up area than in open ground. 
ARBITRATION 
9. Arbitration requires more direct participation by the peacekeeping force. It is necessary to judge 
conflicts, and therefore, even better intelligence is required. There must also be sufficient troops 
and weapon strength available to convince the conflicting sides that the peacekeepers are in fact in 
control. Arbitration therefore requires the same strength as mediation, plus the addition of reserves 
equipped with heavier weapons and equipment. The reserves must be of sufficient strength and 
mobility so that a strong peacekeeping force can be assembled locally which would be stronger 
than either of the opposing sides. As a rough guide, these reserves must be equal to one-third of 
the troops employed in interposing duties, and their equipment must give them mobility, strength 
and an impressive appearance. 
QUALITATIVE REQUIREMENTS 
10. In all forms of peacekeeping the requirement therefore is for officers and men who thoroughly 
understand war. They must have the respect and confidence of both sides in a dispute, and they 
will earn this respect principally from their soldierly bearing. discipline. equipment and their 
reputation as fighting men. In an atmosphere of violence and fighting, the only thing which earns 
respect is soldierly qualities. A peacekeeping force moreover must also be capable of sustaining 
itself administratively, and of living hard if necessary; they must be able to fight in their own 
defence and so must be able to operate as a complete unit. 
11. It is also clear, therefore, that the peacekeeping requirement can best be met by units fully trained 
for war. Training for war produces the knowledge, technical skills, command and staff procedures, 
reconnaissance and intelligence techniques, logistic support systems, and the disciplines needed 
for peacekeeping. In point of fact, actual peacekeeping duties use possibly only one-third of the 
accumulated knowledge and experience of trained soldiers, but the other two-thirds of war training 
is needed to produce the confident, self-contained, flexible and resourceful officers and men that 
the role requires. It follows that a unit well trained for war is also trained for peacekeeping. 
12. The suggestion that is often advanced that we should organize and train specialist units for 
peacekeeping is therefore unsound. Training for peacekeeping would be taken directly from training 
for war. No subject can be found which could be put on a syllabus of training for peacekeeping that 
is not already covered in the present syllabus for training for war. apart possibly from a general 
orientation on UN peacekeeping or on the proposed theatre of operations. Pure peacekeeping training 
moreover, would suffer from the absence of the drive, urgency and sense of purpose that can be 
instilled into men who are being trained for war. Peacekeeping is really pretty dreary pallid stuff; it 
does not stir men or develop a unit spirit. Further, the amount of training needed for peacekeeping 
would not fully extend men and would include boring repetition. 
13. Moreover, the peacekeeping role does not require a special organization different from normal unit 
establishments. If we established a special peacekeeping force from first principles, the result 
would be units, HQ, signals, etc, looking very much like those we now have. 
14. The present system, therefore, is correct and indeed has proved itself. Units should train for war 
and be earmarked for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping as a subject might be studied at staff colleges 
and the National Defence College, but should not form part of a soldier's training. Exercises of a 
peacekeeping nature, or with a UN background, would be useful but only to provide variety and to 
orient thinking on the subject. 
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CONFIDENTIAL 
6 August 1965 
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
1. A number of interesting and related comments have been received as the result of Brig Wilson-
Smith's paper which should be of general interest to those staffs concerned with peacekeeping 
operations .... 
3. Para 2 -The size and type of a force required for a peacekeeping mission is determined as much by 
the kind of situation into which it is to be inserted as by the kind of activity in which it is to be 
engaged. Therefore, it is doubtful that the three levels or categories of peacekeeping operations 
mentioned adequately describe past and future operations. For example, a major peacekeeping 
role may be supervision of a truce ... or an agreement...and ... such supervisory operations may or 
may not involve all of the three levels described in the paper. 
4. Para 3 -In an atmosphere of violence the one characteristic which earns the respect of the opposing 
sides is the soldierly qualities displayed by the officers and men of the peacekeeping force. There 
are many other factors which have to be taken into account as well when selecting suitable personnel 
for those tasks, particularly the officers who will be in personal contact with representatives of the 
opposing sides. The following are but a few of which have to be considered: 
a. Rank: 
b. Medical category: 
c. Personal characteristics: 
d. Experience: and 
e. In some locations, ethnic origin and religion .... 
8. Para 10- The only stated logistic qualitative requirement is contained in this paragraph, i.e., "A 
peacekeeping force, moreover, must also be capable of sustaining itself administratively and of 
living hard if necessary." Experience to date has shown that, while certain special arrangements 
have had to be made to fit the logistic needs of particular forces: 
a. There has been no real difficulty in planning the logistic support of Canadian forces to detailed 
for peacekeeping operations: and 
b. No special training has been required by any of the logistic personnel detailed for duty with 
peacekeeping forces. 
9. Para 11 - While it is true to say that fully trained regular soldiers make the best peacekeeping 
forces for countries such as Canada, which have a long tradition of democracy and of respect by 
the military for the civil power, it is doubtful that this is true of all countries and all traditions. The 
value of troops, fully trained for war, as peacekeeping forces is likely to depend on the orientation 
of military training within the society from which they are drawn, and therefore we should exercise 
caution about generalizing on our own experience in this regard. 
10. Para 12- penultimate sentence- It is suggested that the thought expressed here should never be 
publicly stated or implied. The importance of peacekeeping in our national policy should not be 
downgraded in any way by statements which, even inadvertently, suggest an impatience with the 
peacekeeping role of the Force. 
ll. There was complete support for the main conclusion of the paper, "It follows that a unit (Canadian) 
well trained for war is also trained for peacekeeping." 
[signed] 
F. W. Ball, Air Vice Marshal 
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff 
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